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INTRODUCTION

One of the most important and risky investments a person can make is
deciding to start a business. With so much potentially at risk, knowledge
of exactly what features each type of business entity provides to owners—
including liability, taxation, and management flexibility—is essential to
prospective business owners. Unfortunately, after the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decision in Ogea v. Merritt,1 the issue of personal liability for
limited liability company (“LLC”) members is anything but clear.
For instance, consider the following example involving two new
Louisiana business owners—Lucky and Savvy. Lucky chooses to form an
LLC and believes that the entity will provide the benefits of flow-through
taxation,2 flexible management requirements, and limited liability3 for the
debts of his business.4 Savvy chooses to form a corporation, which he
elects to be taxed as an “S Corporation,” so he also expects to receive flowthrough taxation and limited liability.5 Both operate constructionCopyright 2016, by THOMAS BOURGEOIS.
1. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888 (La. 2013).
2. Flow-through taxation allows the income of the partnership to be taxed
only once. The individual partners report the income of the partnership on their
personal income tax returns, and the partnership itself does not pay income taxes
on its income. 1 ARTHUR B. WILLIS & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAX
¶ 9.01[2] (7th ed. 2013). This avoids the problem that corporate shareholders have
with double taxation—taxation of the income and taxation of the distributions to
shareholders. Id. at ¶ 3.01[1].
3. The phrase “limited liability” is a bit misleading. Although the phrase
seems to imply that a business owner will have limited personal liability for the
debts of the business, the shield actually provides limited risk to business owners.
The owner is not personally liable for any amount of the debts of a business—
save a veil-piercing exception—and the owner’s risk is limited to his or her capital
investment in the business. See infra Part I.B.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 41.01, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 405–07 (1999).
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contracting businesses and enter into contracts on behalf of their respective
companies to build new homes for two individuals. Lucky and Savvy both
forget to pay their renewal fees for their state contractor’s licenses and
therefore are not properly licensed, constituting a misdemeanor criminal
offense.6 During construction, both Lucky and Savvy—sole owners and
employees of their respective businesses—personally perform work that
results in cracked foundations for each of the homes they contracted to
build.
Both homeowners sue, and Lucky and Savvy’s businesses become
liable for damages under claims of breach of contract. Both companies
have few assets, so the plaintiffs seek to recover against Lucky and Savvy
personally for the damages. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:1622(B) makes clear that corporate shareholders in Louisiana are protected
against personal liability for the debts of the corporation.7 Thus, absent a
theory of recovery rendering him personally liable, such as a tort or the
use of a veil-piercing theory, Savvy himself will not be liable for any of
the damages.8 The contract was an obligation of Savvy’s business, not one
he owed personally.9
Lucky is, well, not so lucky. Although the LLC statute was intended
to provide the same—if not stronger—protections to LLC members that
its corporate counterpart provides to shareholders, the Louisiana Supreme
Court interpreted and applied Revised Statutes section 12:1320 by creating
a different and potentially weaker test for determining personal liability in
Ogea. A lower court applying the test from Ogea could find Lucky
personally liable under an “exception” to the limited liability shield
provided to LLC members. One of the “factors” used to determine if one
of the exceptions is met is “criminal conduct.”10 Therefore, a court could
use Lucky’s misdemeanor improper licensing offense to find him
personally liable for the damages resulting from his work on the home.
Further, because Lucky personally performed the poor work, a court could
find that his actions were tortious in nature even though the homeowner
would likely not be capable of establishing a prima facie case under tort
law.11 Thus, although Lucky’s facts are similar to those in Ogea, a lower
6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2160(B), (C) (2007 & Supp. 2015).
7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015).
8. See infra Part I.B (discussing the limited liability shield afforded to
corporate shareholders and LLC members).
9. See Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see also
infra Part I.B (explaining the concept of limited liability, which provides
protections to corporate shareholders as well as LLC members in most states).
10. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 902–04 (La. 2013).
11. See infra Part IV.A.3.a.
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court could weigh the factors differently than the Supreme Court,
imposing personal liability on Lucky despite the plaintiff’s failure to prove
all required elements of a cause of action. The reason for this discrepancy
is because the Ogea Court’s test employs a case-by-case inquiry and,
instead of using true causes of action, looks at “crime” and “tort” factors
that are potentially present.12
Although no justification exists for the contrasting theories of personal
liability,13 this example illustrates what is now true in Louisiana: LLC
members are treated differently from corporate shareholders for purposes
of personal liability.14 This contradictory treatment creates a cloud of
uncertainty for LLC owners and threatens to undermine the limited
liability shield—one of the major advantages the LLC was created to
provide.15 Thus, to supply clarity and certainty to current and prospective
business owners, the Louisiana Legislature should amend Revised Statutes
section 12:1320—which provides for the personal liability of LLC
members—so that it mirrors Revised Statutes section 12:1-622 and the
rules on personal liability of corporate shareholders.
This Comment will explain the problems with Revised Statutes
section 12:1320 and how the statute led to the Court’s unfortunate decision
in Ogea. Part I will provide a brief history of LLCs and explain the
advantages they provide to members. This Part will illustrate how the
limited liability shield typically protects members in certain scenarios. Part
II describes the Louisiana LLC and corporate statutes that determine
personal liability of owners of those respective business entities. Part III
will first explain how Louisiana courts wrestled with the language in
Revised Statutes section 12:1320 before the Supreme Court’s first
examination of limited liability in relation to LLCs in Ogea v. Merritt. This
Part will then analyze the Court’s landmark holding in Ogea. Part IV
provides an in-depth analysis of how Revised Statutes section 12:1320 led
to the Supreme Court’s ambiguous and “all-encompassing” test, including
potential ramifications of the decision. Part V argues that, to cure the
12. See id. at 905.
13. See Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 505 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (applying
principles from a case analyzing personal liability of corporate shareholders to a
case involving personal liability of LLC members); see also 1 CARTER G. BISHOP
& DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS
LAW ¶ 6.01[4] (2012); MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495 (“LLCs
are not different from corporations in any sense that would justify a different
approach to such questions of personal liability.”).
14. Compare Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(addressing personal liability of corporate shareholders), with Ogea, 130 So. 3d
888 (addressing personal liability of LCC members).
15. See infra Part I.A.
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uncertainty that the Louisiana Legislature and the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Ogea created, the legislature should amend Revised Statutes
section 12:1320 to mirror its corporate counterpart.
I. THE HISTORY OF LLCS AND THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
LIMITED LIABILITY SHIELD
LLCs filled an important void for small businesses left open by
corporations and partnerships by providing the limited liability traditionally
associated with corporations in addition to the tax advantages and flexible
managerial provisions of partnerships. These three appealing advantages
create an enticing business entity for businesses large and small and have
led to the LLC quickly becoming a prominent business organization
despite being a relatively new entity type.16
A. The Need for LLCs
Prior to 1977 and the creation of LLCs, new business owners
essentially chose between two types of businesses: partnerships and
corporations.17 General and limited partnerships offered the advantages of
flow-through taxation and flexible management but had no mechanism to
limit the personal liability of general partners for debts of the business.18
Corporations, on the other hand, did not provide shareholders with the
same tax advantages and were subject to rigorous management
requirements and formalities.19 They did, however, protect shareholders
from personal liability for the debts of the corporation.20
With the entities available to a business owner at the time, the best an
owner could hope for was to obtain two out of the three desired advantages.
To avoid the problems that each of these entity types presented, business
owners began forming limited partnerships and naming a corporation as the
16. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in
the United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years
2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 475–76 (2009) (noting that 82%
of new domestic business filings in Louisiana and 58% nationwide were for LLCs
between 2004 and 2007); Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The
Social Cost of Academic Neglect, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 37 (2004) (noting
that 45% of business filings nationwide and 72% of business filings in Louisiana
were for LLCs in 2003).
17. Friedman, supra note 16, at 40.
18. Id. at 40–44 (stating these reasons but acknowledging that they are a bit
exaggerated).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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sole general partner.21 The partnership protected the individual limited
partners from being personally liable for the debts of the business.22 The
only general partner—who alone was personally liable for all debts of the
partnership23—was a minimally capitalized corporation that was often
owned and managed by the limited partners.24 Under this model, no
individual would be personally liable for debts of the business and the
partners received flow-through taxation.25 This method, however, created
extreme organizational complications and inserted rigorous corporate
governance rules into partnerships. Thus, the strategy essentially provided
limited liability and flow-through taxation but not flexible management.
Business owners sought a simpler method that would provide all three
advantages.
Accordingly, in 1977, Wyoming became the first state to enact a
statute allowing for the creation of LLCs.26 Due to uncertainty surrounding
the tax implications of this new business entity, the LLC received little
attention until 1988.27 That year, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
issued a Revenue Ruling stating that an LLC could be taxed as a
partnership—with flow-through taxation—if the entity met certain
conditions.28 After the IRS settled the tax implications, the popularity of
LLCs spread quickly. By 1997, all 50 states had passed statutes providing
for the creation of LLCs.29 LLCs have since become the “dominant form
21. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate General Partners of Limited
Partnerships, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 73, 77–86 (1997).
22. Limited partnerships are called “partnerships in commendam” in
Louisiana. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2844 (2014); see also GLENN G. MORRIS &
WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 5.01, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 176–80 (1999).
23. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2844 (2015) (stating that provisions of general
partnership rules apply to partnerships in commendam); id. art. 2817 (stating that
general partners are liable for their “virile share” of the debts of the partnership).
24. See Hamilton, supra note 21, at 79.
25. Id. at 79–80.
26. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 483.
27. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and
Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 858–59 (1995).
28. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. The IRS originally established the tax
status of a given LLC by determining whether the entity’s characteristics were
more similar to a corporation or to a partnership. See id. The distinctions,
however, became so blurred that this test was replaced with “check-the-box”
regulations, which allow LLCs to choose their own tax status. 2 LARRY R.
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 16:4 (2003).
29. Richard M. Lipton & John T. Thomas, Impact of Final Check-the-Box
Regulations Awaits Further IRS Guidance and States’ Input, 14 J. PARTNERSHIP
TAX’N 91, 99 (1997).
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of business organization in the United States”30 for closely held firms and
have grown significantly faster than any other business type that provides
limited liability to owners.31 LLCs are advantageous to members in many
respects, particularly to owners of small businesses. They provide the
flow-through taxation of a partnership, along with limited liability for
members, and flexible management options that are well-suited to small
businesses.32
B. The Limited Liability Shield33
Properly understood, “no member . . . of a limited liability company
is liable in such capacity for a debt, obligation, or liability of the . . .
company”34 unless a claimant establishes liability under a “veil-piercing”
theory.35 The limited liability shield protects members from personal
liability resulting solely from the member’s status as owner of the LLC.36
LLC members, however, are generally not protected from any personal
30. NICHOLAS KARAMBELAS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: LAW,
PRACTICE AND FORMS § 6.2 (2d ed., Supp. 2013).
31. Chrisman, supra note 16, at 475–76; Friedman, supra note 16, at 37.
32. Friedman, supra note 16, at 43–44; see also id. at 49–55; MORRIS &
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.01, at 483 (“[LLC] statutes are designed to achieve
the basic objective of a partnership-like entity that confers corporate-like limited
liability.”); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited
Liability Company Acts—Issues Relating to Personal Liability of Members, 47
A.L.R.6TH 1, 1 (West, Westlaw through 2009).
33. This Comment refers to a “correct” determination of personal liability
several times. A “correct” determination of personal liability for members follows
the process outlined in this part of the Comment. The limited liability shield
described here is the proper and generally accepted theory of the protections
provided to shareholders and members.
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(B) (2010).
35. Wooster, supra note 32, § 16 (“Only in narrowly defined circumstances
can an individual member of a limited liability company (LLC) be subject to
personal liability for obligations for which the LLC would be solely liable; similar
to the concept of ‘piercing the corporate veil,’ these exceptions may be
characterized as ‘piercing the company veil.’”). Generally, corporations and LLCs
are treated as separate legal entities, hence the theory behind the limited liability
shield. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 32.01, at 50–52. Courts use “veilpiercing” theories to disregard the separate personality of the owners and treat the
two as one “person” to impose liability on an owner for a debt that would normally
only be a liability of the business. See id.
36. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the
personal liability of sole proprietors and partners to that of members to which no
personal liability attaches “merely from the status as ‘owner’”).
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obligations that may arise from conduct they undertake in connection with
the LLC’s business.37 Members can become personally liable for these
types of actions under several bodies of law including, but not limited to,
contract, tort, and agency.38 The relevant inquiry for a court in determining
a member’s personal liability is whether the member would be liable for
the actions in question if he were not an owner of the business but rather a
non-member employee or agent.39 In contrast, sole proprietors and general
partners are personally liable for the debts of their businesses simply
because of their status as owners.40
A common and easily understood hypothetical for demonstrating the
protections of the limited liability shield involves an employee of a
business delivering a package for his or her employer. While driving a car
to make the delivery, the employee carelessly hits a pedestrian crossing
the street. The employee is obviously liable to the pedestrian for his
negligence under a tort theory, assuming the other tort elements are
present, because the employee has a personal duty not to hit the
pedestrian.41 The business will also likely face liability under a theory of
vicarious liability because the employee was in the course and scope of his
employment when the accident occurred.42 The business will be
vicariously liable regardless of the entity type. If the business were a sole
37. Id. at ¶ 6.04 (“[T]he shield provides no protection when a member
engages in actionable conduct. Liability in those circumstances can arise under
both common law and statutory rule, and the fact that a member’s conduct is in
connection with, or even in the service of, an LLC will not negate liability.”).
38. See id. (providing an explanation of the numerous ways in which a
member can be liable); see also Wooster, supra note 32, §§ 10–16; RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 28, § 12:4 (providing general rules and examples).
39. This concept will be explained further in the example below.
40. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2817 (2015); see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,
supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the personal liability of sole proprietors and
partners to that of members to which no personal liability attaches “merely from
the status as ‘owner’”); MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 22, § 6.06, at 246.
41. More generally, it could be said that the employee has a duty to operate
the vehicle in a responsible manner or simply with due care. Whatever
formulation of the duty is used, the result is the same—the driver owed a tort duty
to the pedestrian.
42. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320; Timmons v. Silman, 761 So. 2d 507, 510
(La. 2000); see also WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 9:11, in 12 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 145–47 (2000). Additionally, the business’s vicarious
liability does not affect the employee’s personal liability for the tort. The two
become solidary obligors to the victim and both remain liable despite having
different legal sources of liability. Narcise v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 427 So. 2d
1192, 1194 (La. 1983); see also CRAWFORD, supra, § 8:2, at 134–35.
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proprietorship or a general partnership, the owner or owners of the
business would be personally liable for the business’s debt—a tort
judgment—just as they would be for any of its other debts because those
entities do not provide limited liability for their owners.43
If the business were an LLC or a corporation, however, the members
or shareholders would not be personally liable to the pedestrian.44 This is
within the scope of the limited liability shield—protecting owners from
liability arising solely from their status as owners. But if the driver were
also an owner of the LLC or corporation, he or she would be liable to the
pedestrian.45 The fact that an employee is also an owner of the business
does not absolve the employee of liability for his or her own tortious
conduct; this liability does not result from the member’s ownership of the
business, but rather because he committed a tort.46 The limited liability
shield does not provide any form of immunity to owners for their personal
obligations, but merely protects owners from the entity’s liabilities.47 Even
if the member acted in his or her capacity as a member or in fulfillment of
an employment duty owed to the LLC, the limited liability shield would
not protect the member from liability because the obligation resulting from
the member’s careless driving is personal and belongs to the member.48
LLCs are an extremely important new form of business. They provide
their members with an entity type better suited for small businesses than
43. Owners of those types of businesses are liable for the debt and obligations
of the business simply because of their status as owner. See LA. CIV. CODE art.
2817; see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the
personal liability of sole proprietors and partners to that of members to which no
personal liability attaches “merely from the status as ‘owner’”); MORRIS & HOLMES,
supra note 22, § 6.06, at 246.
44. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the
personal liability of sole proprietors and partners to that of members to which no
personal liability attaches “merely from the status as ‘owner’”).
45. Id. at ¶ 6.04 (“The shield provides no protection when a member engages
in actionable conduct. Liability in those circumstances can arise under both
common law and statutory rule, and the fact that a member’s conduct is in
connection with, or even in the service of, an LLC will not negate liability.”).
46. The owner’s personal liability is not affected by the fact that the business
may be vicariously liable for his tortious conduct because he is an employee, just
as a non-owner employee would remain liable in the same scenario. See Narcise,
427 So. 2d at 1194; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 42, § 8:2, at 134–35.
47. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.04 (“The LLC liability shield
relates only to liability arising from a member’s status as member.”).
48. Id. (“The shield provides no protection when a member engages in
actionable conduct. Liability in those circumstances can arise under both common
law and statutory rule, and the fact that a member’s conduct is in connection with,
or even in the service of, an LLC will not negate liability.”).
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the traditional business organizations.49 One of the main advantages of the
entity is to provide corporate-like limited liability to owners.50
Unfortunately, in Louisiana, the legislature chose language in the statute
pertaining to member liability that leads to a large disconnect between
personal liability for owners of LLCs and that of shareholders of a
corporation.
II. LOUISIANA’S CONTRASTING LIMITED LIABILITY STATUTES FOR
CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS
The Louisiana Legislature joined the national LLC trend by enacting
legislation permitting the formation of these important new entities in
1992.51 Unfortunately, the provision in the statute that addresses the
personal liability of members, Revised Statutes section 12:1320, contains
overly broad language. That language eventually led to the Supreme
Court’s misguided test for determining a member’s personal liability. The
legislature’s choice of language also created unnecessary, superficial
differences between the LLC statute and its corporate counterparts.
Because one of the intentions behind the creation of LLCs was to
provide members with the same limited liability associated with
corporations,52 the corporate statutes relating to limited liability in force at
the time the LLC statutes were enacted are a useful starting place. The
corporate statute in effect at the time was relatively simple, stating, “[a]
shareholder of a corporation . . . shall not be liable personally for any debt
or liability of the corporation.”53 The only other relevant provision in the
corporate chapter preserved liability for shareholders who committed
fraud on a third party.54 This was a narrow no-derogation provision, only
49. See supra Part. I.A.
50. Friedman, supra note 16, at 44 (“The limited liability company offers the
default rules of partnership along with limited liability.”); MORRIS & HOLMES,
supra note 5, § 44.01, at 483 (“[LLC] statutes are designed to achieve the basic
objective of a partnership-like entity that confers corporate-like limited liability.”).
51. Act No. 780, 1993 La. Acts 2031, 2083–153; see also MORRIS &
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.01, at 482–83.
52. Friedman, supra note 16, at 44; MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.01,
at 483.
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93(B) (2010) (repealed 2014).
54. Id. § 12:95 (repealed 2014). Importantly, the no-derogation provision was
not necessary to impose liability on shareholders who committed fraud. These
shareholders would be liable for any fraud they personally committed because
they owe a personal duty not to act in this manner such that the limited liability
shield would not protect them from liability. See supra Part I.B (explaining that
the limited liability shield does not protect LLC members from liability for their
own tortious conduct).
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applying to fraud. Courts rarely used this provision and never considered
the statute to be the sole source of liability for corporate shareholders. In
fact, courts routinely ignored this provision and held members liable under
the traditional limited liability shield doctrine.55 In contrast, the language
of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 appears to provide a more
“bulletproof” protection for LLC members than the then-current corporate
statute.56
The LLC statute contains three relevant provisions—an exclusivity
provision, a no-liability provision, and a no-derogation provision. The
exclusivity provision, Subsection A, provides that “[t]he liability of
members, managers, employees, or agents, as such, of a limited liability
company organized and existing under this Chapter shall at all times be
determined solely and exclusively by the provisions of this Chapter.”57
Subsection B states the no-liability rule, providing: “[e]xcept as otherwise
specifically set forth in this Chapter, no member, manager, employee, or
agent of a limited liability company is liable in such capacity for a debt,
obligation, or liability of the limited liability company.”58 In addition,
Subsection C makes LLC participants improper parties to litigation
involving the LLC, save internal disputes.59 The statute then continues
with the no-derogation provision, Subsection D, stating:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as being in derogation
of any rights which any person may by law have against a
member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability
company because of any fraud practiced upon him, because of any
breach of professional duty or other negligent or wrongful act by
such person, or in derogation of any right which the limited

55. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La.
1975); Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 479–80 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
56. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93(B) (repealed 2014) (stating simply that “[a]
shareholder of a corporation organized after January 1, 1929, shall not be liable
personally for any debt or liability of the corporation”); see also MORRIS &
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 493–96.
57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(A).
58. Id. § 12:1320(B).
59. Id. § 12:1320(C) (“A member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited
liability company is not a proper party to a proceeding by or against a limited
liability company, except when the object is to enforce such a person’s rights
against or liability to the limited liability company.”). This provision appears to
severely limit a LLC member’s exposure to liability, but is rarely invoked as the
jurisprudence in the area rarely, if ever, discusses it.
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liability company may have against any such person because of
any fraud practiced upon it by him.60
Subsections A and B illustrate that the legislature clearly intended for
Revised Statutes section 12:1320 to be a “one-stop shop” for determining
a member’s liability. This intent is evident from the use of language such
as “solely and exclusively” and “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically set
forth in this Chapter.”61 When the statute was originally enacted, its effects
were potentially even more far reaching because it did not contain the
scope-limiting words “as such” in Subsection A or “in such capacity” in
Subsection B.62
The no-derogation rule in Subsection D does not explicitly create or
limit any causes of action that a claimant may have against a member.63
Seemingly, the legislature added Subsection D to avoid a scenario in
which the professional corporation statutes would expressly preserve
liability for professional misconduct while the parallel LLC statute
remained silent. Because the legislature intended for professionals to have
the ability to form LLCs, the legislature simply copied the language from
the existing professional corporation statutes64 into the new LLC statute to
avoid the risk that the omission would lead a court to interpret the statute
as protecting professional LLC members from malpractice claims.65 The
60. Id. § 12:1320(D).
61. Id. § 12:1320(A), (B). This language will be referred to in this Comment
as the “exclusivity language.”
62. Act No. 475, 1993 La. Acts 1177, 1183.
63. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(D) (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be
construed as being in derogation of any rights . . . .” (emphasis added)).
64. The state’s corporate law is divided into several chapters. The discussion
of the repealed shareholder liability statute earlier in this Part is in reference to the
business corporation statutes found in Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 12,
Chapter 1. The Revised Statutes set out a separate set of rules for each
“professional” corporation type—such as professional law or medical
corporations—found in Title 12, Chapters 8 through 12, 14 through 21, and 23.
65. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall
be construed as in derogation of any rights which any person may by law have
against an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder, director, officer of agent of the
corporation, because of any fraud practiced upon him, or because of any breach
of professional duty or other negligent or wrongful act, by such person . . . .”).
Although only a subsidiary issue in this Comment, Subsection D’s language
creates a large problem in the LLC context. In the professional corporation
statutes, the subsection’s source, each statute clearly preserves liability for a
particular “professional duty” because each professional corporation chapter
pertains to only one identified profession. But in the LLC context, the
“professional duties” that the statute refers to and the types of “professions” that
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exclusivity language in the statute, however, has led to an interpretation
that this language is an attempt to list the exclusive causes of actions for
which members may become personally liable for a business debt.66 The
professional corporation statutes do not contain exclusivity provisions,67
so courts have never interpreted these statutes as providing the only
available source of liability for professional shareholders.
In contrast, the recently enacted corporate statute governing the
personal liability of shareholders for debts of corporations is more
straightforward than both the parallel LLC statute and the prior corporate
statute. The new statute simply states, “[a] shareholder of a corporation is
not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation.”68 When
adopting the statute from the Model Business Corporation Act section
6.22, the legislature chose to delete the phrase “except that [the
shareholder] may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or
conduct” from the end of the sentence.69 The reason for the deletion, as
stated in a comment to the statute, was that the phrase “could have been
interpreted to provide an independent basis for personal liability based
simply on a corporate actor’s having engaged in some kind of personal
conduct in connection with the corporation’s operations.”70 The comment
acknowledges that a shareholder could still be held liable for personal
conduct if, for example, the acts amount to a tort.71 The comment clarifies
that bodies of law other than corporate law—including tort law, contract
law, and agency law—should determine liability.72 The comment further
states that if a court holds a shareholder personally liable for “personal acts
are included in the definition of “business” are not clear because there is no list of
those professions anywhere in the LLC chapter. Although a very important issue,
whether any type of tradesman that is not included in one of the professional
corporation chapters is or should be considered a professional under the LLC
chapter is outside the scope of this article. For two cases looking at this issue, see
Syzygy Construction, L.L.C. v. McKey, 156 So. 3d 763, 768–69 (La. Ct. App.
2014), and Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., 158 So. 3d 71, 75–76 (La. Ct. App.
2014).
66. See, e.g., Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 896 (La. 2013); Hooper v.
Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 135 So. 3d 9, 20 (La. Ct. App. 2013); Regions Bank
v. Ark-La-Tex Water Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 740 (La. Ct. App. 2008);
Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 2006); see also infra Part
III.A.2.
67. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807.
68. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015).
69. Id. at cmt. a.
70. Id. at cmt. c.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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or conduct in connection with the operation of the corporation, the
[shareholder] is being held liable for his own acts or debts, not those of the
corporation, so no need exists to state the exception.”73
A comparison of the corporate and LLC owner liability statute reveals
several major differences. For example, Revised Statutes section 12:1320
provides that personal liability of members should be found only by
reference to the LLC chapter; the corporate statute contains no parallel
limitation. Further, the LLC statute also purports to determine liability for
managers, employees, and agents of the business, yet the corporate statute
merely limits liability for shareholders. Additionally, Revised Statutes
section 12:1320(D) attempts to preserve liability for members under
certain theories, while the analogous general business corporation statute
contains no such preservations.74 Unfortunately, the differing language
contained in Revised Statutes section 12:1320 serves as the basis for
numerous misapplications of the limited liability shield to LLC members.
III. JURISPRUDENCE ON PERSONAL LIABILITY OF LLC MEMBERS
The many Louisiana appellate court decisions interpreting the farreaching language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 highlight the
uncertainty the statute has created. Even with a large body of corporate
jurisprudence to borrow from, the courts continuously come up short in
determining a member’s liability due to the differences in the statute’s
language. Despite this jurisprudential confusion, the Louisiana Supreme
Court did not address personal liability of LLC members until 2013 in
Ogea v. Merritt.75
A. Comparing Pre-Ogea LLC Cases with Corporate Cases
No Louisiana court has been able to properly articulate the
circumstances under which an LLC member should be held personally
liable, largely due to the deficiencies of Revised Statutes section

73. Id.
74. The corporation chapters of the Louisiana Revised Statutes are split into
several major types. The important distinctions for this Comment are between the
general business corporation chapter and the professional corporation chapters.
The general business corporation statute—Louisiana Revised Statutes section
12:1-622—does not contain this preservation language. The professional
corporation statutes do contain this language. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:807 (2010).
75. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888 (La. 2013).
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12:1320.76 However, because there is no justification to treat LLC
members and corporate shareholders differently in terms of personal
liability, jurisprudence interpreting the liability of corporate shareholders
is helpful in providing a model analysis for how the limited liability shield
should apply to LLC members in Louisiana.77
1. Traditional Corporate Analysis of Shareholder Liability
Donnelly v. Handy is an enlightening corporate liability case,
addressing whether the sole shareholder of a small construction
corporation could be liable for negligent supervision and defective
construction.78 Handy, the defendant, signed a contract on behalf of his
corporation to build a home for Donnelly, the plaintiff.79 Donnelly filed
suit after disputes arose between the parties about the quality of the work.80
After acknowledging that shareholders cannot be liable for debts of the
business, the court looked for distinct theories under which Handy could
be personally liable outside of corporate law.81
Initially, the court stated that Handy could not be liable for breach of
contract because the contract was between the corporation and the
plaintiff, and Handy signed only in his capacity as president.82 The court
then looked at whether Handy could be held liable for negligence83 and
held that a shareholder could only be personally liable to a third party for
a tort if the shareholder owed a personal tort duty to the third party.84 The

76. See infra Part IV (discussing these deficiencies and how they led to the
Ogea holding).
77. See supra Part I.A (discussing the advantages of LLCs, including
“corporate-like” limited liability); see also Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 901 (“LLCs are
not different from corporations in any sense that would justify a different
approach to such questions of personal liability.” (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES,
supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495)); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 505 (La. Ct.
App. 2006) (applying principles from a case analyzing personal liability of
corporate shareholders to determine personal liability of LLC members).
78. Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 479–80 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
79. Id. at 479.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 479–80.
84. Id. at 480. This is known as the “personal duty” theory. See H. B. “Buster”
Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La. 1975); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283
So. 2d 716, 720 (La. 1973); Manning v. United Med. Corp. of New Orleans, 902
So. 2d 406, 410–11 (La. Ct. App. 2005); 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
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court further explained that if a shareholder injures a third party through a
breach of that duty, the shareholder is personally liable “whether or not the
act culminating in the injury is committed by or for the corporation . . .
and it does not matter that liability might also attach to the corporation.”85
The court found that Handy did not owe a personal duty to the plaintiff to
provide quality construction work or to properly supervise the
corporation’s employees.86 Instead, Handy merely owed a duty to the
corporation that he worked for, not to its customer.87 Conversely, the
corporation owed a contractual duty to the plaintiff to provide quality work
and to supervise its employees.88 Therefore, the court found the
corporation—but not Handy—liable.89 The analysis in Donnelly is wellreasoned and follows the typical framework used in cases adjudicating a
corporate shareholder’s personal liability.
2. Lower Courts’ Attempts at Analyzing LLC Member Liability
When adjudicating the personal liability of LLC members, however,
courts have not provided such a technically sound analysis. Many
appellate courts have interpreted Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) as
providing an exclusive list of the causes of actions under which a court
may hold a member personally liable.90 This interpretation of the statute
differs from the corporate jurisprudence where courts simply look to
standalone theories of liability that exist outside of corporate law rather
than a list of exceptions.91 Perhaps this is because the shareholder liability

FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6214, at 441–42 (2004
& Supp. 2008).
85. Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 481 (quoting H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc., 318
So. 2d at 12).
86. Id.
87. Id. The duty was to properly “supervise, inspect, govern, control and
manage the construction” and resulted from being an employee of the corporation.
Id.
88. Id. at 481–82.
89. Id. at 482.
90. See, e.g., Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 135 So. 3d 9, 20 (La. Ct.
App. 2013); Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734,
740 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 503–05 (La. Ct. App.
2006).
91. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La.
1975) (analyzing tort liability of a corporate shareholder); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535
So. 2d 918, 921–23 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing liability of corporate
shareholders under agency theories); Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 481.
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statute provides no similar list and no exclusivity provision.92 Although
one old corporate statute did contain a narrow no-derogation provision for
fraud,93 the courts never viewed this as the sole potential source of
liability94—likely because of the lack of an exclusivity provision.95
Additionally, many appellate courts have also interpreted the exclusivity
language and the words “in such capacity” to mean that a member cannot
be held personally liable for any of the “exceptions” in Subsection D
unless the member was acting “outside” of his or her capacity as
member.96 This too diverges from the corporate jurisprudence where a
shareholder’s “capacity” does not affect a court’s determination of
personal liability.97
Further problems have arisen when courts interpret the “breach of
professional duty” language in Subsection D. In several cases, plaintiffs
sued members of construction LLCs alleging personal liability for faulty

92. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015).
93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:95 (2010) (repealed 2014). The new corporate
shareholder liability statute does not contain any no-derogation provisions. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-622 (2015).
94. See, e.g., Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 479–82 (addressing potential personal
liability of a corporate shareholder under contract and tort theories).
95. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93(B) (2010) (repealed 2014).
96. See, e.g., Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 135 So. 3d 9, 20 (La. Ct.
App. 2013) (“The evidence in the record revealed that all actions taken by [the
members] with regard to the [plaintiff’s] property . . . were in their capacities as
members or agents of [the LLC]. Hence, they are not personally liable for any
debt, obligation or liability of [the LLC].”); Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water
Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 740 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (finding liability where
the member “was not acting solely in his capacity as a member of the limited
liability company”); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2006)
(“To have meaning within the statute, the phrase ‘or other negligent or wrongful
act by such person’ must refer to acts that are either done outside one’s capacity
as a member . . . of a limited liability company or which while done in one’s
capacity as a member . . . of a limited liability company also violate some personal
duty owed by the individual to the injured party.”); Curole v. Ochsner Clinic,
L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 92, 97 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (“To have meaning within the entire
statute, the phrase ‘or other negligent or wrongful act by such person’ must refer
to acts done outside one’s capacity as a member, manager, employee, or agent of
the limited liability company.”).
97. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975)
(analyzing tort liability of a corporate shareholder); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So.
2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing liability of corporate shareholders under
agency theories); Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 481.
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or poor workmanship on work the member actually completed.98 In those
cases, the courts strongly implied that they were holding the members
liable under the “breach of professional duty exception” but did not
expressly do so.99 Rather, these courts held the members personally liable
by stating that they were “negligent”—violating the standard of care100—
in performing the work without establishing any specific duty owed to the
claimants.101 In corporate cases with similar facts, courts focused on
whether the shareholder who performed the faulty work owed a tort duty
to the plaintiff, not solely on whether their acts violated the standard of
care or whether the members were acting as professionals.102 In the
corporate context, contractors are not professionals, and therefore, the
shareholders in construction liability cases will not be liable to their
customers for poor work absent a veil-piercing theory because they owe
no personal duty.
The tension between traditional applications of the limited liability
shield and the language in Revised Statutes section 12:1320 has long been
98. See, e.g., Matherne v. Barnum, 94 So. 3d 782, 785–86 (La. Ct. App.
2012); Regions Bank, 997 So. 2d 734, 736; W.J. Spano Co. v. Mitchell, 943 So.
2d 1131, 1131–32 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
99. See Matherne, 94 So. 3d at 788–90; Regions Bank, 997 So. 2d at 740–41;
W.J. Spano Co., 943 So. 2d at 1133.
100. In a typical negligence tort case in Louisiana, the plaintiff must prove the
following elements: (1) a duty, (2) a breach of that duty (negligence), (3) that the
breach was the cause in fact of the harm, and (4) the actual injury. See CRAWFORD,
supra note 42, § 4:2, at 76–78. In these cases, the courts did not address the
presence of all of these elements. They held the member–contractor liable because
the member breached—was negligent and violated the standard of care—but
skipped the question of whether there was a duty owed that could be breached in
the first place. This may not have changed the result of the cases because the
courts could have found that the contractors were professionals and therefore
owed a tort duty to the plaintiffs. By not expressly holding so, however, the courts
left gaping holes in their analyses.
101. See Matherne, 94 So. 3d at 788–90; Regions Bank, 997 So. 2d at 740–41;
W.J. Spano Co., 943 So. 2d at 1133.
102. See, e.g., Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 479–80; see also H. B. “Buster”
Hughes, Inc., 318 So. 2d at 10–12. In Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., the
Supreme Court held that licensed contractors were not professionals as
contemplated by the LLC chapter. No. 2015-C-0087, 2015 WL 5972529 (La. Oct.
14, 2015). This Comment does not seek to address the merits of either side of that
debate. For the purposes of this Comment, the important issue is not whether a
contractor is a “professional” as contemplated by the LLC chapter, but the manner
in which the courts used the professional liability preservation in Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) to hold members liable without establishing
a personal tort duty.
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apparent. The above cases demonstrate how the lower courts attempted to
solve the mysteries created by the statutory language, although almost all
attempts have resulted in legally unsound analyses. The lower courts acted
with no guidance from the Supreme Court until Ogea, which unfortunately
did little to clear the ambiguities surrounding the statute.
B. The Breaking Point: Ogea v. Merritt
Ogea involved a contract between the plaintiff, Ogea, and a
construction contracting business, Merritt LLC.103 The latter agreed to
build a new home for Ogea.104 Travis Merritt, the sole member of the LLC,
personally prepared the dirt “pad” over which the concrete slab for the
home would be poured.105 Upon realizing that the completed slab
contained significant defects, Ogea sued both Merritt LLC and Merritt
personally for violations of the New Home Warranty Act106 and Civil Code
articles related to construction defects.107 The trial court held that “‘[u]nder
one or more of the [legal] theories,’ the damages . . . were caused either
by Merritt LLC or Mr. Merritt or both.”108 Specifically as to Merritt, the
trial court held that he was personally liable because he performed the
negligent work on the pad himself and that his failure to produce an
insurance policy upon Ogea’s request constituted fraud.109
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s
decision to hold Merritt personally liable for the construction defects.110
Merritt argued that because the contract was between the LLC and Ogea,
he should not be personally liable for the LLC’s breach.111 Conversely,
Ogea argued that because Merritt personally completed or supervised all
of the work on the pad, he should be personally liable for the poor
workmanship.112
Relying on language in the LLC chapter, the court reasoned that “the
legislature intended for the personal liability of LLC members to be

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 892 (La. 2013).
Id.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3141 to :3150 (2009).
Ogea v. Merritt, 109 So. 3d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 519.
Id.
Id. at 523, 528.
Id. at 521.
Id.
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different from the personal liability of corporate shareholders.”113
According to the court, under Revised Statutes section 12:1320, members
received limited liability for the debts of the LLC as long as the debt or
liability at issue was not caused by the member’s own actions that would
constitute an “exception” under Subsection D.114 The court then
determined that Merritt was negligent in preparing the dirt for the home
and therefore was personally liable to Ogea for the damages even though
they were a result of the LLC’s breach of contract.115 Under this analysis,
a member of an LLC could be held liable for the business’s debt if his or
her conduct was the source of the defective performance regardless of
whether the member owed a personal duty to the injured party. This
analysis differs significantly from the typical inquiry to determine the
liability of corporate shareholders—whether the person owed a personal
duty to the claimant.116
The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently granted writs and
reversed the portion of the Third Circuit’s decision holding Merritt
personally liable.117 In its first interpretation of Revised Statutes section
12:1320, however, the Court implicitly agreed with the Third Circuit that
the legislature intended to provide a different and weaker form of
protection against personal liability to the members of an LLC than that
provided to the shareholders of a corporation.118
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that LLCs are juridical
persons and are legally distinct from their owners.119 The Court then
113. Id. at 522. Specifically, the Third Circuit stated that it was precluded from
looking at the law pertaining to corporate shareholders because the LLC chapter
explicitly stated that LLCs were unincorporated associations and because the
exclusivity language in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) prevented
it from looking anywhere outside of LLC law. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 523–24.
116. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La.
1975); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716, 720 (La. 1973); Manning v.
United Med. Corp. of New Orleans, 902 So. 2d 406, 410–11 (La. Ct. App. 2005);
Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 480 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see also FLETCHER,
supra note 84, § 6214, at 441–42; supra Part I.B.
117. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 907 (La. 2013).
118. Compare Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 479–80 (acknowledging that
corporations and shareholders are distinct from one another and inquiring as to
whether the shareholder owed a personal duty to the plaintiff to determine tortious
personal fault), with Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 895–907 (creating a test and factors to
be used in analyzing Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:1320).
119. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 894–95 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2013)). The
Court acknowledged that members can be held liable for debts of the business if
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recited the statutory interpretation guidelines to set up the framework for
its purportedly conservative statutory interpretation,120 stating that
Subsection A provides for the LLC chapter to exclusively govern the
personal liability of members.121 According to the Court, the statute creates
a “general rule” of limited liability for members for the debts, obligations,
and liabilities of the LLC in Subsection B, with exceptions to that shield
listed in Subsection D.122 To find a member personally liable for the debts
of an LLC, according to the Court, the claimant must (1) be “a person who
‘by law’ has a cause of action against [the member] individually” and (2)
have obtained that cause of action as a result of “‘any fraud practiced upon
[him or her]’ or ‘any breach of professional duty or other negligent or
wrongful act.’”123
1. The Fraud Exception
The analysis then turned to the first “exception” to a member’s limited
liability—fraud. The Court used a definition of fraud from the obligations
section of the Civil Code, but found that the record lacked any evidence
showing that Merritt committed fraud because Ogea did not enter into
evidence the insurance policy at issue.124

a claimant proves a “veil-piercing” theory; however, the Court quickly dismissed
this discussion because neither party nor the lower courts discussed this issue. Id.
at 895.
120. See id. at 896 (“Within our civil law system, the starting point in the
interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Words and phrases
shall be read in context and shall be construed according to the common and
approved usage of the language.” (citations omitted)). The word “conservative”
as used in this sentence means “traditional” in the sense that the Court stated it
should look only to the text of the statute to provide an interpretation.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 896–97. Although there may be other exceptions to personal
liability elsewhere in the LLC chapter, the Court limited this opinion to the
“exceptions” listed in Section D, just as the trial court and Third Circuit had done
in the case. Id. at 897. Other exceptions may include, for example, liability for
unlawful distributions, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1328 (2010), and failure to
make required contributions, id. § 12:1322.
123. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 897 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(D)).
124. Id. at 897–98. The Court additionally implied that the insurance policy
probably would not have provided coverage for the damage anyway, so Ogea
suffered no harm. See id. at 898.
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2. The Breach of Professional Duty Exception
The next exception the Court analyzed was whether Merritt breached
a professional duty.125 The key question was whether contractors are
considered “professionals” within the LLC chapter.126 Despite the
question’s importance,127 the Court chose not to provide an answer.128
Instead, the Court illustrated how the word “professional” had a clearly
defined meaning in business entity law, listing the professions for which
professional corporation statutes have been enacted.129 Although Ogea
argued that contractors should be equated to the other traditional
professions and subjected to the professional duty standards, the Court
avoided the question by noting that the LLC held the contractor’s license,
not Merritt personally.130 The Court again found the record void of any
evidence showing that Merritt himself was a professional.131
3. The “Negligent or Wrongful Act” Exception
The Court then moved to its final exception to limited liability—a
“negligent or wrongful act.”132 This portion of its analysis began by
rejecting Merritt’s argument that the words “negligent or wrongful act” as

125. Id.
126. The question of whether a certain occupation should be considered a
profession has never been an issue in corporate law because each chapter of the
professional corporation statutes pertains to only one specifically named
profession. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807(D) (found in the professional
law corporation chapter); id. § 12:907(C) (same language in the professional
medical corporation statute).
127. See, e.g., Matherne v. Barnum, 94 So. 3d 782, 788 (La. Ct. App. 2012);
Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 740 (La.
Ct. App. 2008); W.J. Spano Co. v. Mitchell, 943 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (La. Ct. App.
2006). For more recent cases directly addressing this issue, see Syzygy
Construction, L.L.C. v. McKey, 156 So. 3d 763, 768–69 (La. Ct. App. 2014), and
Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., 158 So. 3d 71, 75–77 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
128. The Court later answered the question by stating that contractors are not
professionals in the LLC context. See Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., No.
2015-C-0087, 2015 WL 5972529 (La. Oct. 14, 2015).
129. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 898–99. The “traditional” professions contemplated
by the professional corporation chapters are: lawyers, medical doctors, dentists,
accountants, chiropractors, nurses, architects, optometrists, psychologists,
veterinarians, and architectural engineers. See id.
130. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 899.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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used in Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) mean simply a tort.133 The
Court stated that although the terms are commonly used in tort law, they
are also used in criminal law, mineral law, and court reporter bond laws.134
The Court pronounced four factors to guide lower courts in analyzing the
“negligent or wrongful act” exception:
1) [W]hether a member’s conduct could be fairly characterized as
a traditionally recognized tort [the tort factor]; 2) whether a
member’s conduct could be fairly characterized as a crime, for
which a natural person, not a juridical person, could be held
culpable [the criminal conduct factor]; 3) whether the conduct at
issue was required by, or was in furtherance of, a contract between
the claimant and the LLC [the contract factor]; and 4) whether the
conduct at issue was done outside the member’s capacity as a
member [the capacity factor].135
Favoring a fact-intensive inquiry, the Court required each case to be
decided on its specific facts and for courts to analyze all of the factors in
their decisions.136 Thus, one factor may be dispositive of personal liability
in one case but not in others. A court is not bound to base its decision on
whether a member should be personally liable on the existence of any one
of the enumerated factors in every case.137
a. The Tort Factor
The Court first turned to the “tort factor.” Under this factor, the
commission of a tort by an LLC member “weighs in favor of” the
“negligent or wrongful act” exception.138 Although explaining that the tort
factor could weigh in favor of personal liability for a member, the Court
quoted a case assessing personal tort liability for a corporate shareholder
and acknowledged that shareholders are liable for any personal torts they
commit if they owe a personal duty to the victim.139 The Court then
inexplicably stated that LLC members should not be treated differently

133. Id. at 900.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 900–01.
136. Id. at 905; but see Hodge v. Strong Built Int’l, LLC, 159 So. 3d 1159 (La.
Ct. App. 2015) (ignoring the criminal conduct and contract factors).
137. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 114.
138. Id. at 901.
139. Id. (quoting H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La.
1975)).
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than corporate shareholders when determining personal liability after
overtly doing exactly that.140
The opinion next held that, when analyzing the tort factor, courts
should focus on whether the member owes a personal tort duty to the
alleged victim.141 The duty cannot be merely a contractual duty to do
quality work, however, otherwise the general rule for limited liability
would be negated in many cases.142 The Court was unclear whether a
person must prove all of the elements of a traditional tort or simply
establish a personal tort duty for this factor to be present.143 Finally, despite
saying that no factors were always dispositive, the Court also stated that
the tort factor may be dispositive because finding that a member breached
a personal tort duty owed to the claimant could be enough to “pave the
way to a member’s personal liability for the tort.”144
Under the facts of this case, however, the Court found no evidence that
Merritt owed any personal tort duty to Ogea.145 According to the Court,
holding a member liable for poor workmanship arising out of the LLC’s
contract does not alone establish a negligent or wrongful act because doing
so would “negate the general rule of limited liability.”146 The Court held
that the tort factor was not present because Ogea proved only poor
workmanship.147

140. Id. (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495). This
particular portion of the Court’s analysis is ironic. It cites a corporate case that
commands shareholders be held liable for their torts for the proposition that an
LLC member’s tort should merely weigh in favor of personal liability.
Additionally, the Court’s statement that members and shareholders should have
the same personal liability is extremely ironic considering the test the Court is
creating is substantially different from the analysis used in corporate cases.
141. Id. at 901–02.
142. Id. at 902.
143. Id. at 901. (“Of course, a claimant must prove all elements of a claim to
succeed in a tort action. Applying . . . tort law, when examining whether a member
of an LLC can be personally liable in tort, the threshold question to be asked
regarding the member is therefore: ‘Was any duty of care owed to plaintiff (was
it a foreseeable risk)?’” (emphasis added)). This point will be examined further
infra Part IV.A.3.a.
144. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905. The Court also recognizes that an order of
restitution by a criminal court after a conviction may also make the criminal factor
dispositive. Id. at 905 n.14.
145. Id. at 905.
146. Id. at 905–06.
147. Id. at 906.
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b. The Criminal Conduct Factor
The Court went on to explain the “criminal conduct factor.” According
to the Court, if the member’s conduct “constitutes a crime, that fact weighs
in favor of the ‘negligent or wrongful act’ exception,” which in turn favors
a finding of personal liability.148 Ogea limited the crimes to which a court
may look at to those that a natural person, rather than solely a juridical
person, could commit.149 Considering crimes for which only juridical
persons could be guilty would thwart the general rule of shielding an LLC
member from the business’s debts.150
As its first justification for why criminal conduct should favor
personal liability, the Court said that a victim of a crime may be granted
restitution and that shielding a criminal from that liability simply because
he was a member of an LLC would be inequitable.151 As an example, the
Court demonstrated how licensing requirements could weigh in favor of
personal liability for members.152 Under the Court’s test, an LLC member
who acts as a contractor without a proper license would be more likely to
be personally liable for debts of the business.153
As the second justification for the factor, the Court stated that criminal
statutes sometimes provide the basis for tort duties.154 The explanation
began with odd language stating that when a civil claimant proves that a
member’s criminal conduct creates a “right of recovery,” the situation
“weighs in favor of” finding personal liability.155 Even so, the Court
explained that the member does not have to have been actually convicted
of the crime to establish the factor.156 According to the Court, Subsection
D does not require a claimant to have already obtained a legal remedy, but
rather only requires a claimant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a right—not a remedy—that he or she may have
against the member.157 The Court clarified this ambiguous language by
stating that its true intent was to allow courts to use a criminal statute as a
148. Id. at 902.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 902–03. “Engaging in the business of contracting without authority”
is a misdemeanor crime. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2160 (2010).
153. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 902–03.
154. Id. at 903–04 (quoting Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So. 2d 790, 793
(La. 1992)).
155. Id. at 903.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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“civil duty” in a tort analysis to determine personal liability.158 The Court
did not require that the crime be the cause of any damage but did state that
the crime must be “related” to the damage.159 The Court quickly dismissed
the presence of the crime factor in this case because Ogea made no
allegations that Merritt engaged in any criminal conduct.160
c. The Contract Factor
Under the Court’s “contract factor,” a member is less likely to be
found personally liable for a debt or obligation of the business if his or her
conduct “was required by, or was in furtherance of, a contract between the
claimant and the LLC.”161 The rationale for this factor is that, under
Subsection B, members should not be liable for an obligation of the
LLC.162 Thus, according to the Court, if the member acts to satisfy one of
these obligations, he or she should be more likely to qualify for limited
liability.163 Here, the Court found that Merritt’s actions in preparing the
dirt and supervising the construction were taken in furtherance of the
contract between Merritt LLC and Ogea.164 The contract factor, therefore,
weighed against personal liability for Merritt.
d. The Capacity Factor
The final of the Court’s four factors under the “negligent or wrongful
act” exception is the “factor of acting inside or outside the LLC.”165 Under
this factor, actions taken “outside” of an LLC owner’s capacity as a
member weigh in favor of personal liability.166 To illustrate this factor, the

158. Id. at 903–04 (quoting Gugliuzza, 606 So. 2d at 793).
159. Id. at 903 n.13 (“Unrelated criminal conduct is simply irrelevant and
cannot advance a claimant’s burden of proving that an exception to limited
liability applies. Drawing as an example a variant from the facts of this case, we
would be hard pressed to see how a member receiving a traffic citation one day
on the way to the job site would breach a duty owed to a landowner who
contracted with the member’s LLC for construction of a home.”).
160. Id. at 906.
161. Id. at 904.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 906.
165. This factor will be referred to as the “capacity factor” throughout this
Comment.
166. Id. at 904 (quoting Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 504 (La. Ct. App.
2006)).
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Court chose to use the “principal-mandatary” relationship.167 Ogea stated
that if a member becomes a mandatary for the claimant and breaches any
of its duties owed to the claimant as principal, the member could become
personally liable for the breach because he was acting as a mandatary for
the claimant, not as a member of the LLC.168
The Court’s second example considers a scenario where a member
acts as an undisclosed agent for the LLC. The opinion states that when a
member–agent fails to disclose that he is acting on behalf of the LLC, the
member can become “personally liable for the contracts that he negotiates
on his principal’s behalf”169 because he or she is “acting ‘outside’ the
structure of an LLC.”170 Both of these examples tip the scales toward a
finding of personal liability for the member, but only after weighing the
other three factors as well.171
As to this factor, the Court found that Merritt was acting in his capacity
as a member at all relevant times, which weighed against finding him
personally liable for the damage to the home.172 Ogea knew that the
contract was between herself and Merritt LLC, not Merritt personally;
therefore, no issue existed as to whether Merritt was acting as an
undisclosed mandatary or outside of his capacity as a member.173
4. Limitations and Holding
In concluding its opinion, the Court was careful to limit its application.
Ogea stated that members can still personally obligate themselves to a
contract, which would always result in personal liability if the member
breached that contract.174 The Court also stated that parties to construction
contracts may still secure performance bonds to protect the client if the
contract is not completed satisfactorily.175 The Court then reversed the
portion of the appellate court decision holding Merritt personally liable for
the damage to the home and affirmed the remainder of the issues on
appeal.176

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 904–05.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905 (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 33.04, at 105–06).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 906.
Id.
Id. at 907.
Id.
Id.
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The Court’s opinion interprets Revised Statutes section 12:1320 as
providing both a general rule of limited liability in Subsection B and
exceptions to that rule for the theories listed in Subsection D.177 Ogea
creates four factors for determining whether particular actions of a
member constitute one of the exceptions to limited liability.178 Despite its
best efforts to clear up this area of law, the Court created immense
uncertainty and confusion for LLC members trying to anticipate the
circumstances under which they may be held personally liable when acting
in connection with the LLC.
IV. MISGUIDED STATUTORY DRAFTING LEADS TO MISGUIDED
INTERPRETATION
The legislature’s attempt at an overly protective statute led the
Louisiana Supreme Court to create an ambiguous and uncertain test for
determining the personal liability of LLC members. The Court attempted
to perform a restrained statutory analysis only to misinterpret the statute
and to insert in its place the Court’s own “four factor” test, which calls for
lower courts to combine the policies of numerous distinct bodies of law in
an indeterminate manner. This misinterpretation partially is due to the
overly broad and ambiguous scope of Revised Statutes section 12:1320.
Applying the Supreme Court’s exceptions and factors may lead to
situations in which a court may impose personal liability when it otherwise
should not or, conversely, situations in which a court may not impose
personal liability when it otherwise should. In addition, Ogea created
numerous policy issues needing resolution. Regardless of its genesis, the
Ogea decision clearly creates a myriad of problems for LLC owners, most
importantly uncertainty as to their exposure of personal liability in
conducting business.
A. How the Problems with Revised Statutes Section 12:1320 Led to Ogea
The Supreme Court’s Ogea decision has led to a huge disparity
between the state’s LLC law and traditional limited liability law. The
legislature’s drafting of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 led to the
problems with the Supreme Court’s overall general rule–exception
framework, and the Court’s exceptions and factors have created specific
issues that the legislature did not anticipate.

177. Id. at 896–97.
178. Id. at 900–01.
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1. The Overreaching Drafting of Revised Statutes Section 12:1320
The drafters of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 attempted to make
the statute more inclusive than necessary from the start. Subsections A and
B state that the LLC chapter of the Revised Statutes exclusively governs
the personal liability of “members, managers, employees, [and] agents” of
LLCs.179 The legislature’s attempt, however, to determine the liability of
managers, employees, and agents is unnecessary. A correct application of
the traditional limited liability shield only protects members from personal
liability for debts or obligations of the business that arise solely because
they are owners.180 Applying the shield to non-owners of the business is
unnecessary because no “tenet of law” exists to extend liability to those
categories of people for debts of the business in the first place.181 In
contrast, both the old and new versions of the corporate statute purport to
determine the liability only of corporate shareholders, not anyone else
associated with the corporation.182 The original language of the statute
shows how protective the drafters intended the statute to be. Although the
legislature may have fixed one problem with its language, the remaining
concerns surrounding the statute not nearly resolved.
Another example of the legislature’s overreaching attempt to cover all
possible personal liability theories can be seen in Revised Statutes section
12:1320’s original language. Without the scope-limiting language “as
such” and “in such capacity” in Subsections A and B, the first version of
the statute provided only that LLC law exclusively determines the liability
of LLC members at all times.183 Under this language, whether a member,

179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320 (2010).
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[4]; see also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:1-140(15C)(a) (2015) (defining “owner liability” as “personal
liability for a debt, obligation, or liability of a domestic or foreign business or
nonprofit corporation or unincorporated entity that is imposed . . . [s]olely by
reason of the person’s status as a shareholder, partner, member, or interest
holder”).
182. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93 (2010)
(repealed 2014).
183. Act No. 475, 1993 La. Acts 1177, 1183. The original language of the
statute is reproduced below with the amended portions in brackets:
A. The liability of members, managers, employees, or agents[, as such,]
of a limited liability company . . . shall at all times be determined solely
and exclusively by the provisions of this Chapter.
B. Except as otherwise specifically set forth in this Chapter, no member,
manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company is liable [in
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employee, manager, or agent of an LLC could be liable for personal
obligations, such as a home mortgage was unclear, because nothing in the
LLC provisions created liability for these categories of people for any
personal contracts.184 To quell these concerns, the legislature added the
words “as such” and “in such capacity” so that now the statute “governs
exclusively unless it doesn’t.”185
The exclusivity provision of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 is also
responsible for many of the statute’s shortcomings.186 The language is
unnecessary because the legislature had no reason to attempt to place all
possible theories of personal liability into a single statutory provision.
Corporate law makes no attempt to do so, and courts consistently find
shareholders personally liable for their own liabilities and debts without
even referring to the corporate limited liability provision.187 The courts
reach this result by leaving the determination of personal liability—
outside of piercing the corporate veil—to other bodies of law that give rise
to personal liability for shareholders.188
Despite the legislature’s apparent best efforts to create a pro-business
statute that limits the liability of those associated with LLCs to the furthest
extent possible, the superfluous language has actually backfired and
created much uncertainty for LLC members. The unnecessary language
forced the Supreme Court to generate a new test in Ogea that potentially
destroys one of the most important advantages the entity is designed to
offer.
2. The Overreaching Language Leads to Ogea’s General RuleException Framework
In Ogea, the Court’s general rule of no liability and three exceptions—
fraud, breach of professional duty, and negligent or wrongful acts—derive
such capacity] for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability
company.
Id.; see also supra Part II.
184. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495.
185. See id.
186. See infra Part IV.A.2.
187. Courts consistently find liability for personal contractual obligations,
under agency principles, see, e.g., C.T. Traina Plumbing & Heating Contractors,
Inc. v. Palmer, 580 So. 2d 525 (La. Ct. App. 1991), and for tort liability, U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Ledford, 244 So. 2d 252 (La. Ct. App. 1971); see also MORRIS &
HOLMES, supra note 5, §§ 33.01 to 33.13.
188. See supra Part I.B (providing an application of the limited liability
shield).
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from language found in Revised Statutes section 12:1320.189 Ideally, the
Court would not have viewed the no-derogation provision in Subsection
D as creating exceptions but instead would have treated that provision as
referring to separate and distinct legal theories. The reason for the Court’s
use of these separate causes of action as exceptions and its creation of
factors, however, is readily apparent. Because the statute commanded the
Court not to look outside of LLC laws when determining personal liability,
the Court sought to ensure that members and others associated with an
LLC could not escape personal liability simply because the statute did not
expressly provide for liability under a particular theory. In an attempt to
preserve liability for members, employees, managers, and agents under all
of the traditional theories of recovery, the Court combined several bodies
of law into one indeterminate and confusing test. In actuality, each of the
“exceptions” and the four “negligent or wrongful act” factors are
standalone legal theories that should result in personal liability for an LLC
member without reference to a framework or test, as they would under
corporate law.190
The source of the Court’s “exceptions”—Subsection D—is
completely unnecessary, making the Court’s erroneous interpretation even
more frustrating. The legislature simply copied the no-derogation
provision from the professional corporations statutes to avoid an apparent
disconnect.191 The provision was only placed in the professional
corporation statutes to ensure that liability for professionals would not
change simply because they were providing services through a corporate,
limited liability entity.192 Essentially, the legislature wanted to assure the
public that professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, would still be liable
for malpractice despite performing their services through a corporation—
which would have been true even without this language.193 The statutory
189. See Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 896–97 (La. 2013).
190. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 28, § 12:4; supra Part IV.A.3;
supra Part I.B (explaining that the limited liability shield does not protect owners
from personal liability from their own personal conduct).
191. See supra Part II.
192. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 42.06, at 454–55. The noderogation provision does not tempt courts to treat the theories of recovery as
“exceptions” in the professional corporation context because those statutes do not
contain an exclusivity provision. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807 (2010).
193. Just as non-professional corporate shareholders remain liable for the torts
they commit in connection with their businesses, professionals remain liable for
malpractice despite performing their services through a corporation. See, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807(C); see also MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 42.06,
at 454–55.
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preservation is superfluous because the limited liability shield does not
protect from this type of personal obligation in the first place.194
Similarly, the duplication of this language in the LLC statute is not
necessary because Subsection B purports to shield members only from
liability for debts or obligations of the LLC.195 On the other hand,
Subsection D and the professional corporations statutes attempt to do
nothing more than preserve a member or shareholder’s personal liability
for their own debts and obligations. The provisions preserve rights that a
claimant may have “against a member” and are silent as to any rights that
the person may have against the LLC.196 Clearly, this subsection is
excessive because no statute attempts to limit the liability that it preserves
in the first place.
Further, the theories of liability the Court used to formulate its
exceptions and factors are, in fact, not exceptions to the limited liability
shield at all. They are completely separate and distinct theories of recovery
that create personal liability for the member because of his or her own
actions, not liability for a debt of the entity.197 The key inquiry is whether
the member would be liable if he or she were simply an employee or agent
of the LLC and not an owner.198 This inquiry is much clearer as articulated
in corporate law, where Revised Statutes section 12:1-622 simply states
that shareholders are not liable for the debts of the corporation.199 No
interpretation problems exist there because the statute does not contain a
no-derogation provision preserving liability for any theory or limiting a
shareholder’s personal liability to a particular chapter of the Revised
Statutes.200

194. See supra Part I.B.
195. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(B) (“Except as otherwise specifically set
forth in this Chapter, no member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited
liability company is liable in such capacity for a debt, obligation, or liability of
the limited liability company.”).
196. Id. § 12:1320(D) (emphasis added).
197. These theories include torts, contracts, agency, and other traditional
theories of recovery. See supra Part I.B.
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015).
200. In cases adjudicating the personal liability of corporate shareholders,
courts proceed directly to these traditional theories of recovery without having to
analyze a statute or navigate any test. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v.
Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975) (analyzing tort liability of a corporate
shareholder); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing
liability of corporate shareholders under agency theories); Donnelly v. Handy,
415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
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Take, for example, the breach of professional duty exception. A
member is liable for his or her own torts regardless of whether the actions
are committed in connection with the business.201 A breach of a
professional duty should result in a malpractice claim against the member,
and he or she should be held personally liable to the third party as a
tortfeasor regardless of the member’s status as owner.202 The limited
liability protections merely shield a member from liability for debts of the
business and so are not implicated because the professional is personally
liable for his own misconduct.
Based on the language of the statute, the idea that the legislature
intended for courts to use the reservations in Subsection D as an exclusive
list of exceptions to the limited liability shield seems plausible. What
seems more likely is that the statute was simply an overreaching attempt
to protect members from personal liability in situations to which the
limited liability shield would normally not apply. The legislature likely—
and unwisely—was attempting to make holding a person connected with
an LLC personally liable for any act taken in connection with the business
impossible.203 But the legislature, feeling compelled to include Subsection
D’s no-derogation provision, created another possible interpretation.
Interpreting Subsection D as providing a list of exceptions to a general rule
rather than separate theories of liability results in an analysis out of touch
with the plain meaning of the statute and traditional limited liability law.
In that sense, almost all of the Court’s interpretation misconstrues the
plain language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320, although the language
itself does not conform to the traditional scope of the limited liability
shield. The no-liability provision—Subsection B—does not create a
“general” or absolute rule against members for personal liability for
actions taken in connection with the business; rather, that provision merely
protects them from personal liability for debts of the business. The noderogation provision, instead of providing exceptions to the no-liability
provision, merely states that the statute should not affect a member’s
liability for his personal actions, seemingly clarifying the scope of
Subsection B. When the exclusivity provision is added to the equation,
however, the reason why the Court chose to create the Ogea test becomes
obvious—to preserve the typical theories under which owners of limited
liability entities can become personally liable for actions taken in
connection with the business.
201. See supra Part I.B.
202. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 28, § 12:4; see also supra Part I.B.
203. Of course, this cannot be true as these people can clearly be held
personally liable under other bodies of law—for instance, tort. See supra Part I.B.
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In essence, the Court had two evils to evaluate: (1) interpret the plain
language of the statute correctly and (2) leave gaps in personal liability
from the statute’s poor drafting or misinterpret the language in an attempt
to cover all theories of personal liability. Had the Court interpreted the
plain language of the statute correctly, a member would not become liable
for, say, acting as an undisclosed agent because nothing in the LLC chapter
of the Revised Statutes imposes liability on a member for that type of
action. Therefore, the Court was essentially forced to house all of these
theories in one test under the statute. Although the Court may have acted
with the best of intentions, the new analysis is legally unsound and creates
numerous potentially incorrect applications.
3. The Negligent or Wrongful Act Factors
In addition to the issues with the overall framework, many problems
are specifically presented within the negligent or wrongful act exception.
The Court’s use of separate forms of liability as mere factors weakens the
legal effects of those theories. For instance, if a claimant can prove all
elements of a tort or has a restitution claim against a member of an LLC,
the claimant should be able to bring the claim and succeed in recovery.
Under Ogea, however, the tort or crime is now just one part of a fourfactor test, so proof of the theory of recovery will not automatically result
in liability for the member. Other than the general problems that result
from using standalone legal theories as “factors,” each of the “factors”
present unique complications.
a. The Tort Factor
Much of what the Court says about the tort factor is correct under the
traditional limited liability shield—specifically the focus on the presence
of a personal tort duty. Besides a tort actually being a separate legal theory,
two problems with this factor persist. First, the Court is unclear as to
whether a claimant must prove all elements of tort or only a duty and
breach. Making the tort analysis merely a “factor” implies that a claimant
should not have to prove all elements of a tort to find the factor present. If
the Court intended to require claimants to establish all elements of a tort,
no justification would exist to make torts a “factor” and not deem them
standalone theories of recovery. If proof of only a duty and a breach of
that duty is necessary, however, a court could hold a member personally
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liable without the claimant having to prove an entire legal theory upon
which to impose the liability.204
Second, the Court should have been more careful when discussing the
legal ramifications of Merritt’s poor workmanship. The Court did not find
the tort factor present because Ogea only proved poor workmanship
arising out of a contract, which amounts to a breach of contract, not a
tort.205 Poor workmanship may, however, constitute a tort if the actor is a
professional; in those situations, poor workmanship becomes malpractice
because professionals owe a special tort duty to their hirers.206 For
example, if a doctor or lawyer performs his or her work poorly, that doctor
may become liable for malpractice as a tort, even though the doctor is
actually acting in furtherance of a contract with a client or patient.207 This
tort is a result of the professional duty, and without that professional duty
in Ogea, the Court correctly determined that no tort had occurred.
b. The Criminal Conduct Factor
The criminal conduct factor is equally perplexing. The Court uses two
misguided justifications for the factor and does not require the crime to be
the cause of the claimant’s damages. First, the Court was unclear what
legal theory creates the basis for finding liability under this factor. Using
a criminal statute as a standard for determining a duty as part of a tort
analysis does not justify another “factor.” Instead, a court could simply fit
the criminal statute into its tort analysis and hold the defendant personally
liable under tort law or find the tort factor present. Further, if the criminal
statute at issue in a given case expressly provides for restitution, then a
court should use that statute rather than Revised Statutes section 12:1320
to provide a basis for the member’s personal liability because the statute
204. Additionally, the Court used unfortunate language in its first listing of the
negligent or wrongful act factors when it stated that one of the factors is whether
the conduct “could be fairly characterized as a traditionally recognized tort.” Ogea
v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 900 (La. 2013). This language seems to suggest that
the Court requires only proof of “tort-like” conduct, without proof of an actual
tort duty, or other elements of a prima facie case, to find the tort factor present.
This may seem like a trivial point because the Court clarified that at least a tort
duty and breach were required. Subsequent decisions, however, have quoted only
this “tort-like” language when analyzing the negligent or wrongful act exception
and stated nothing about a tort duty. See, e.g., Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C.,
158 So. 3d 71, 77 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (Amy, J., dissenting).
205. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905–06.
206. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 160 (2010).
207. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807(C) (2010); see also MORRIS &
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 42.06, at 454–55.
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in no way limits the member’s liability for personal debts and
obligations.208 Using a restitution provision in a criminal statute or using a
statute as a “duty” in a tort analysis are completely separate theories of
recovery housed outside of business entity law, not “exceptions” to the
limited liability shield or “factors” in any analysis. These theories should
have no place in an analysis under Revised Statutes section 12:1320. In
addition, the Court only stated that the case and crime should be “related”
but did not require the crime to be the cause of the harm.209 This ambiguity
could result in crimes only tangentially related to the harm serving as the
basis of personal liability for an LLC member.
c. The Contract and Capacity Factors
Like the tort and criminal conduct factors, the Court’s contract and
capacity factors should not be conceptualized as factors because they are
standalone theories of recovery. The contract factor represents the Court’s
attempt to prevent a member from being liable for breaches of duties that
the LLC owes to the claimant pursuant to a contract to which it alone is a
party.210 The capacity factor is simply an attempt by the Court to ensure
that its new framework covers agency theories—such as undisclosed
mandate—and obligations that a member personally guarantees or those
for which he or she personally contracts. A court’s focus, however, should
not be on what “capacity” the member was acting in, but whether the
member or other affiliated person owed any personal duties to the
claimant.211 The language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 again led
the Court to include these theories as mere factors in what it views as a
universal scheme of personal liability for members.

208. The Court’s decision to use the contractor’s licensing statute to illustrate
the “criminal conduct” factor is also troubling. The relevant statute does not itself
provide for restitution, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2160 (2007 & Supp. 2015), and
the Court does not state that the statute would be used as a tort “duty.” Ogea, 130
So. 3d at 902–03. The Court essentially created a new theory of liability based on
an ill-defined way on the premise that an LLC member violated a criminal statute.
209. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 903 n.13.
210. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 482 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that a corporate shareholder was not personally liable for the poor work
he completed in furtherance of his corporation’s contract because the corporation
had the contractual duty, not the shareholder); Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water
Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 742 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (Caraway, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. See supra Part I.B; supra Part III.A.2 (discussing cases using the
“capacity” factor).
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Further, the Court’s undisclosed agency example is troublesome.212 A
traditional analysis would simply show that under the law of mandate, the
member is personally liable for the contractual duty because the member
acted as an undisclosed agent.213 Failure to disclose his or her status as an
agent is the cause of liability, not the capacity in which the person was
acting.214 Revised Statutes section 12:1320 is not implicated in these
situations because the member is being held liable for a personal debt, not
one belonging to the business. The problems with these two factors, along
with the other factors and exceptions, create immense uncertainty and
potentially lead to extreme misapplications of the traditional limited
liability shield.
B. Potential Applications of the Court’s Ruling
The problems with the statute and opinion become even more apparent
when analyzing potential applications of the Court’s test. Under certain
circumstances, a court may find no personal liability for a member under
Ogea when that member normally would become liable under traditional
legal theories. For example, consider a situation where a member making
a delivery for his LLC strikes a pedestrian with his automobile.215 The
member owes a personal duty to the pedestrian not to hit her. If the
pedestrian can prove the remaining elements of a tort, then under
traditional limited liability law, the member will be personally liable to the
pedestrian for the damages he causes in the accident, regardless of his
ownership interest.216 Limited liability under Revised Statutes section
12:1320(B) is not implicated because the liability is personal and not a
liability of the business.
But, under the Ogea analysis, a court would have to determine whether
an “exception” to limited liability was met. Analyzing the “negligent or
wrongful act” exception, the “tort” factor would be present. The member,
however, did not commit any crime, was acting in furtherance of the
212. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905.
213. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2015); see also MORRIS & HOLMES, supra
note 5, § 33.04, at 105–07.
214. An undisclosed agent may in fact be acting in his capacity as an agent of
the LLC, but the third party has no knowledge of that, hence the resulting personal
liability. Further, a tortfeasor employee may be acting in his capacity as an
employee, but should still be liable in an automobile accident that his negligence
caused. See Narcise v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (La. 1983);
see also CRAWFORD, supra note 42, § 8:2, at 134–35.
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. See supra Part I.B.
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LLC’s contract to deliver the package, and was acting in his capacity as
member and employee of the LLC. Three factors would weigh against
holding the member personally liable, and one factor would weigh in favor
of liability. Because, as the Court stated, no single factor is automatically
dispositive, a court could easily find no personal liability existed in this
situation even though the member should clearly be personally liable
under traditional tort law.217
Conversely, a court applying Ogea may find a member personally
liable when that member would not be under traditional legal theories. For
example, consider a member, whose driver’s license expired the previous
day, striking a pedestrian with his car after driving through a
malfunctioning stop light on his way home from work. Imagine that in a
suit against the member, the claimant cannot prove causation—a required
element in negligence tort cases218—because the city’s broken traffic light
caused the accident. Under a proper analysis, the member would not be
liable to the claimant because the claimant cannot prove a legal theory
upon which to base a recovery.
But under Ogea, a court could determine that the member’s actions
were criminal because he was driving with an expired license, were not in
furtherance of an LLC contract because he was going home, and were not
taken in his capacity as a member of the LLC because he was not working.
A court could hold a member liable for the damages by finding three out
of four factors under the “negligent or wrongful act” exception even
though no traditional legal theory exists under which to hold the member
liable. Although a court may be unlikely to do this, but given that the
claimant would have been one element short of proving a tort, this result
is certainly possible under Ogea. Courts have the ability to weigh the
individual factors in any way they see fit, which, as these examples
illustrate, makes the test inherently subjective and unpredictable. However
unlikely these potential applications may be, the uncertainty of how the
cases would be decided is the true problem with Ogea.
C. Policy Problems Created by Ogea
Aside from the specific problems with the framework and factors, the
Ogea decision creates some broader policy concerns. First and most
217. Although Ogea stated that the tort factor may be dispositive, a court is
not required to find liability automatically if all of the elements of a tort are
proven. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905.
218. See Morris v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 553 So. 2d 427, 429 (La. 1989)
(“[T]he elements of a [tort] cause of action are fault, causation, and damage.”);
see also CRAWFORD, supra note 42, § 4:6, at 82–84.
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importantly, the decision creates large amounts of uncertainty for LLC
owners, who are now unsure under what circumstances a court may hold
them personally liable for the debts of the business. Ideally, courts would
provide LLC members with the same certainty that they give to corporate
shareholders—no personal liability for debts of the business unless the
corporate veil is pierced.219 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation
of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 casts doubt on one of the major
advantages LLCs were intended to provide to their owners.220
The Court’s “factor” test, which determines whether a member’s
actions meet the “negligent or wrongful act” exception, is too ambiguous.
This test allows courts to hold LLC members personally liable without
fully proving any one theory of recovery.221 The test incorrectly introduces
several completely distinct bodies of law into business entity law. When a
court is deciding whether a member should be personally liable for his or
her actions, that court should use the policies of that particular body of
law, such as contracts, torts, or agency. Ogea combines all of these policies
and doctrines into one “test.” This improper merger of unique bodies of
law appears ill advised; in theory, a judge should have tort policies in mind
when deciding whether a member owes a personal tort duty to a claimant,
not contract or agency policies. The “factor” test bleeds these areas of law
together and makes unclear under which theory a court is holding a
member liable or if the court is finding liability without proof of all
elements of any theory.222
The Court’s framework of using the no-derogation provision in
Subsection D as exceptions to a general rule of limited liability creates
numerous problems. That framework misinterprets the plain language of
Revised Statutes section 12:1320 and in doing so transforms numerous
standalone theories of recovery into either an exception or one of four
factors in a test. The language in the poorly written LLC statute is the most
prominent cause, however, because that language led the Court to believe
that its opinion had to encapsulate all possible theories of recovery for
actions taken in connection with an LLC in one all-encompassing test. The
problems with the statute, along with the Ogea decision and its potential
applications, make changes to LLC law absolutely necessary.

219. Smith v. Cotton’s Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759, 761–63 (1987); see
also MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 33.01, at 50–52.
220. See supra Part I.A.
221. See supra Part IV.B (providing examples of potential problems with the
factor test).
222. See supra Part IV.B (providing an example of how a court could find
personal liability without proof of an entire legal theory of recovery).
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V. WHY THE LEGISLATURE MUST MIRROR THE LLC
AND CORPORATE STATUTES
To alleviate the errors and concerns arising from the Supreme Court’s
Ogea decision, the Louisiana Legislature should amend Revised Statutes
section 12:1320 to mirror Revised Statutes section 12:1-622(B), the
parallel corporate statute. The legislature could not have intended for
courts to treat LLC members and shareholders differently, but the Court’s
Ogea decision yields exactly that result. Leaving the lower courts to trudge
through the Supreme Court’s extremely amorphous decision threatens the
financial stability of LLC owners because of the extreme uncertainty
surrounding the potential outcomes under the test in any number of
scenarios.
If the legislature were to mirror the corporate statute, lower courts could
easily analogize to liability decisions involving corporate shareholders. No
justification exists to treat the two entities differently with respect to owner
liability,223 and the only reason that courts have done so is because of the
language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320.224 LLCs pose the same risks
to persons affected by the limited liability rule as corporations. A third party
is not concerned with whether the business with which the third party is
interacting with is an LLC or a corporation because the third party likely
believes its rights against the owners of each are the same.
Mirroring the corporate and LLC statutes would clarify to courts that
the owners of the two business entities should be equally protected and
would allow courts determining the personal liability of LLC owners to
more easily use corporate cases as a guide. Because LLCs are the fastest
growing type of entity in the state,225 this analogy would allow limited
223. See Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 901 (La. 2013) (“LLCs are not
different from corporations in any sense that would justify a different approach to
such questions of personal liability.” (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5,
§ 44.06, at 495)); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 505 (La. Ct. App. 2006)
(applying principles from a case analyzing personal liability of corporate
shareholders to determine personal liability of LLC members).
224. See Ogea v. Merritt, 109 So. 3d 516, 522 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (holding
that the legislature intended the two types of owners to be treated differently based
on language in the LLC chapter); see generally Ogea, 130 So. 3d 888 (creating a
test for member personal liability based on the language on Revised Statutes
section 12:1320).
225. Chrisman, supra note 16, at 475–76 (noting that 82% of new domestic
business filings in Louisiana were for LLCs between 2004 and 2007); Friedman,
supra note 16, at 37 (noting that 72% of business filings in Louisiana were for
LLCs in 2003).
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liability shield law226 to develop even more quickly, as many more LLC
cases are bound to appear on dockets. Mirroring the statutes would render
most of the current jurisprudence interpreting Revised Statutes section
12:1320 useless, providing the advantage of ridding the law of these
incorrect applications of the limited liability shield.227 The portions of
those decisions that were correct would still be applicable, and the portions
that were not—such as the “general rule-exception” framework and the
“capacity” factor—would be eliminated completely. Courts should instead
apply the mass of prior corporate shareholder liability jurisprudence in the
LLC context because cases have correctly determined the liability of
corporate shareholders for years.228
Although the intent of this amendment would be to mirror the
corporate liability rules, removing only Subsection D—the no-derogation
provision—could cause courts to believe that the legislature intended to
protect LLC members from tort claims for breaches of professional duties.
In some ways, this assumption would be reasonable because the
preservation language would be present in the professional corporation
statutes but removed from the LLC statutes, creating an obvious difference
between the two. To dispel this concern, the legislature should simply add
a reference to the professional corporation statutes in the new version of
Revised Statutes section 12:1320.229 The ideal statute should read:
A member of an LLC is not personally liable for the acts or debts
of the LLC. This section does not affect the personal liability of any
member for a breach of a professional duty if the member meets the
qualifications for exercising share voting power in, or participating
in the earnings of, any form of professional corporation authorized
in Title 12.230

226. By providing identical statutes for both corporations and LLCs, the courts
could easily analogize between cases involving different entity types. The result
would be one collection of jurisprudence that applies equally to both corporate
shareholders and LLC members, hence the designation “limited liability shield
law.”
227. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Louisiana jurisprudence pertaining
to personal liability of LLC owners before Ogea).
228. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La.
1975); Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 482 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
229. This reference would also provide guidance on the question of which
occupations are considered “professions” in the LLC chapter.
230. Only licensed members of the designated profession may exercise voting
rights and share in the earnings of a professional corporation. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12:805(B)(1), :801(A)(2)(a) (2010). The incorporation of this rule
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Additionally, comments to the statute explaining the reasons for the
change would be helpful to alleviate any concerns that a court may hold
an LLC member liable for an obligation of the LLC if the member commits
malpractice. Courts would not interpret the second sentence as creating
“exceptions” to limited liability—as in Ogea—because the exclusivity
language from the current statute would be completely eliminated.
There would also be no concern that courts would not be able to
“pierce the company veil” despite the fact that veil piercing would not be
expressly provided for in the statute. Neither the current LLC nor the
corporate statute contains any mention of piercing the corporate veil,231 yet
courts have regularly employed the doctrine as a theory to create personal
liability for both shareholders and members.232 Courts have no reason to
disregard this theory simply because it would not be in the revised version
of Revised Statutes section 12:1320. In fact, there would be more
justification for courts to use veil-piercing theories in LLC cases because
the legislature would have clearly showed its intention for courts to place
LLC members and corporate shareholders on equal footing with respect to
liability.
CONCLUSION
One of the main purposes behind limited liability companies is to
provide limited liability to members for the debts of the business. The
Louisiana Supreme Court’s Ogea v. Merritt decision thwarts this advantage
by circumventing the traditional method of determining personal liability of
business owners protected by the limited liability shield. The decision is a
direct result of the Court’s attempt to fit all possible theories of recovery into
one test because of the legislature’s use of unnecessary language in Revised
Statutes section 12:1320. The decision creates a vague and indeterminate
test that combines, in undetermined portions, the policies of several bodies
of law that should be kept separate from one another. Further, Ogea
threatens the protections the legislature intended to provide LLC members
into the LLC statute would ensure that the second sentence of the statute related
to professional duties would only apply to professional LLC members.
231. See id. § 12:1320; id. § 12:93 (2010) (repealed 2014) (old corporate
statute); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622 (2015) (current corporate statute).
232. See, e.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991)
(corporate case acknowledging the ability of claimants to “pierce the corporate
veil” and citing only case law for authority); Charming Charlie, Inc. v. Perkins
Rowe Assocs., L.L.C., 97 So. 3d 595 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (LLC case
acknowledging the possibility of piercing the veil of an LLC and citing only case
law as authority).
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and creates a mass of uncertainty for the fastest growing entity type in the
state.
Therefore, the Louisiana Legislature should amend Revised Statutes
section 12:1320 to mirror its corporate counterpart, Revised Statutes
section 12:1-622(B). This amendment would abrogate the Supreme
Court’s Ogea decision and clarify that LLC members should be treated the
same as corporate shareholders for purposes of personal liability.
Louisiana courts have properly adjudicated personal liability for corporate
shareholders previously, and analogizing LLCs to corporations would
clear the uncertainty currently surrounding member liability. Louisiana
has an important interest in protecting LLC members, and they should not
be forced to put the fate of their financial livelihoods in the hands of a
court applying a confusing and legally unsound test.
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